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Abstract
This paper studies di¤erent types of commitment policy in an economy where the deterministic steady
state is ine¢ cient. We show how a policy suggested by the approach of policy design entails positive
long-run ination, even in the purely forward-looking canonical New Keynesian model. The long-run
ination target is robust to ination persistence due to backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by
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equilibrium and present robustness analysis in terms of two structural parameters.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies optimal monetary policy within New Keynesian models, the canonical purely forward-
looking model and its variant due to backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by a fraction of price
setters. The topic of what constitutes optimal monetary policy in microfounded models with nominal
price rigidities, which Clarida et al. (1999) intriguingly label the science of monetary policy from a New
Keynesian perspective, has been the subject of a very large body of literature.
On the one hand, the literature has emphasised that discretionary conduct of policy leads, in addition
to the well-known ination bias stressed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983),
to the so-called stabilisation bias. Woodford (1999, 2003, Chapter 7) and Clarida et al. (1999) discuss
how a central bank that is able to credibly commit can inuence private sector expectations in a way that
leads to more favorable responses to cost-push shocks. In particular, Woodford (1999, 2003, Chapter 7)
shows that optimal policy under commitment is history dependent whereas discretionary policy is purely
forward-looking. The logic behind the optimality of history dependence is quite intuitive. In an economy
where private sector expectations are formed rationally, commitment by the central bank can inuence these
expectations only if the central banks earlier commitments are sustained in later periods. Hence, successful
steering of private sector expectation requires that central banks conduct in later periods depends not only
on the current state of the economy but also on the state of the economy in earlier periods.
On the other hand, within the commitment class of policy, the timeless perspective optimality concept
proposed by Woodford (1999) has received a great deal of attention1. Policy is labelled timeless as it reects
a type of commitment that, unlike the zero-optimal policy, constraints the policy reaction function to be
the same in the initial period as in all succeeding periods. By ignoring the temptation of exploiting the
expectations existing in the economy, commitment policy is timeless, namely time-invariant, as the central
bank abides to the same rule of conduct in all periods, including the one in which the policy is introduced.
Indeed, the commitment class of policy is time-inconsistent from the perspective of Kydland and Prescott
(1977), but timeless perspective commitment policy achieves time invariance whereas the zero-optimal
commitment policy, although being truly optimal given the policy problem under commitment, implies
that central banks behaviour in the initial period di¤ers from central banks behaviour in all subsequent
periods. The zero-optimal policy and the timeless perspective policy in fact di¤er only with respect to the
central banks posited behaviour in the initial period. Given the intertemporal nature of the aggregate-
1This solution has been used many times since; for example, Clarida et al. (1999), King and Wolman (1999), McCallum
and Nelson (2004), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Svensson and Woodford (2003), and Walsh (2003), to name but a few.
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supply relation, it follows that the two policies imply di¤erent transition paths for the endogenous variables
to the same optimal long-run values, that is the zero-optimal policy and the timeless perspective policy
share the same optimal long-run ination target.
More recently, Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) show that timeless perspective policy,
as usually described, is not optimal in the sense of Taylor (1979). Taylor (1979) proposes adopting a
monetary policy that, given complete knowledge, in terms of both structural equations and exogenous shock
processes, of the structure of an economy characterised by rational expectations, is optimal on average.
Monetary policy is optimal on average if it yields the smallest unconditional expectation of the central
banks objective function, which, following Woodford (2001), is derived as an approximation to the utility
of the representative household2. Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) expose how an alternative
timeless perspective policy suggested by the approach of policy design delivers superior results, in terms of
the unconditional expectation of the central banks objective function, than the timeless perspective policy
à la Woodford (1999), which is instead implied by the approach of optimal control3. Specically, they
both compare the two timeless perspective policies on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium and consider
a canonical New Keynesian model, namely a model where the aggregate-supply relation, often referred to
as the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC)4, is purely forward-looking and it includes a cost-push shock
term.
In light of the importance of the Phillips curve for the conduct of monetary policy, it is surprising how
little work has analysed these alternative commitment policies in an economy where ination depends on a
convex combination of expected future ination and lagged ination. This is particularly surprising given
the NKPCs failure to capture the fact that ination is persistent, and the current emphasis on the analysis
of robustness of di¤erent types of commitment policy.
This paper aims to partially ll this gap by studying these di¤erent types of commitment policy in
the purely forward-looking canonical New Keynesian economy and its alterations due to backward-looking
rule-of-thumb behaviour by a fraction of price setters, specied either à la Galì and Gertler (1999) or
à la Steinsson (2003). In so doing, di¤erently from Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002), we
consider the empirically realistic case of an economy where the deterministic steady state is ine¢ cient
2Woodford (2003, Chapter 6) provides the most detailed description of the utility-based framework for the evaluation of
monetary policy.
3The same remark in Jensen and McCallum (2002) applies here, policy design means, as in Prescott (1977), a procedure
that entails choosing the optimal parameters in the policy rule after having solved the model with a policy rule that is function
of all relevant state variables. In what follows, we refer to the timeless perspective commitment policy put forward by Blake
(2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) as being the alternative timeless perspective policy whereas by standard timeless
perspective policy we mean the timeless perspective commitment policy à la Woodford (1999).
4Aggregate-supply relation and Phillips curve are used interchangeably in this paper.
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as the distortions due to monopolistic competition are not o¤set by subsidies to production. For every
theoretical economy we describe each commitment policy in terms of target criterion and optimal long-run
ination target. With this latter respect, we derive six optimal long-run ination targets thus confronting
the policy design approach to commitment policy vis-à-vis the optimal control approach.
We show how the timeless perspective commitment policy suggested by the approach of policy design
entails optimal positive long-run ination target, even in the purely forward-looking basic New Keynesian
model. The intuition for this result is quite neat, hinging on the discount factor. What drives the optimality
of zero steady-state ination under Woodfords (1999) timeless perspective commitment policy, or the
associated zero-optimal commitment policy, is the fact that the monetary authority shares the private
sector discount factor. The output cost resulting from the anticipation of higher ination occurs earlier
in time and it is thus weighted more strongly than the output benet stemming from higher ination.
However, expected future ination enters the NKPC with a coe¢ cient that is smaller than the unitary
coe¢ cient on actual ination, with the consequence that the two e¤ects brought about by higher ination
exactly o¤set each other. Hence, despite the ine¢ ciency of the nonstochastic steady state and the existence
of a positively sloped long-run Phillips-curve trade-o¤, there is no long-run incentive for positive ination
and optimal steady-state ination is zero5. Under the alternative timeless perspective policy, the central
banks discount factor di¤ers from the private sectors discount factor: the private sector prefers current
consumption to future consumption whereas the central bank does not discount future, namely every loss
is equally costly for the central bank. On the one hand, the private sectors discount factor appears in the
models structural equations, thus resulting in the long-run Phillips curve trade-o¤. On the other hand,
the central bank now equally weighs the increase in output caused by higher ination and the cost of the
reduction in output as a result of expected higher ination. It follows that the stimulative e¤ect of higher
ination on output is greater than the output cost of higher ination. The long-run Phillips curve trade-o¤
is then exploited and it is optimal for the central bank to commit to positive steady-state ination.
With this respect, the paper can be read as a second answer to what causes positive ination to be
endogenously optimal in the long-run. It can be either optimality in the sense of Taylor (1979), which is
achieved by the commitment policy suggested by the approach of policy design, or, as shown in Pontiggia
(2007), costly disination. The former in fact rationalises a positive optimal long-run ination target even
in a model where the central bank is in theory capable of disinating without incurring any loss in output.
Indeed, the optimal long-run ination target is zero in only one of the six theoretical cases studied.
5Steady-state and long-run are used interchangeably in this paper.
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Moreover, di¤erently from the standard timeless perspective commitment policy, the alternative timeless
perspective commitment policy is robust to the introduction of backward-looking rule-of thumb behaviour
à la Galì and Gertler (1999) by this implies that all price setters behave identically once shocks are
eliminated from the economy. Indeed, Galì-Gertlers backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour does not
alter the steady state that would obtain under forward-looking behaviour by all price setters, neither in
terms of long-run Phillips-curve trade-o¤ nor in terms of steady-state central banks loss function. This
arguably desirable property does not apply in the case of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour à la
Steinsson (2003) as indexation to past output gap by rule-of-thumb price setters changes both the long-run
trade-o¤ between output gap and ination and the steady-state central banks loss function.
We evaluate the alternative commitment policies both the on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium
and on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium. In so doing, our main objective is, as in Jensen and
McCallum (2002), to simply rank the alternative commitment policies. We present robustness analysis
for ample ranges of two structural parameters rather than, as in Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum
(2002), coe¢ cients that are functions of structural parameters. Indeed, the coe¢ cients in the economys
structural equations are functions of two key models primitives: the average duration that an individual
price is xed, namely the degree of price stickiness, and the fraction of rms that reset prices in a backward-
looking manner, that is the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
We follow the cited papers and report average values of the central banks objective function. Regardless
of the details of price setting, zero-optimal commitment policy invariably delivers the highest level of welfare
on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium and the alternative timeless perspective policy is univocally
superior to the standard timeless perspective policy. Moreover, the timeless perspective commitment policy
suggested by the approach of policy design always implies better welfare on the basis of the deterministic
equilibrium than a policy of zero ination at all times, whereas the same it is not always true under the
timeless perspective commitment policy implied by the approach of optimal control. As for welfare on
the basis of the stochastic equilibrium, in the presence of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by
price setters, we also analyse welfare on a conditional basis. The ranking between the three alternative
commitment policies is not strictly univocal, but the alternative timeless perspective policy is usually found
to rank rst, followed by the standard timeless perspective policy and both timeless perspective policies
outperform the zero-optimal policy.
The remainder of the paper is organised in three sections. Section 2 formalises the policy problem
and characterises the three commitment policies discussed in the literature in terms of target criterion
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and optimal long-run ination target. Section 3 compares the three policies on the basis of both the
deterministic equilibrium and the stochastic equilibrium and presents robustness analysis in terms of the
two key models primitives. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2 Model and Policy Description
We consider the basic neo-Wicksellian model in Woodford (2003) and its alteration due to backward-looking
rule-of-thumb behaviour by a fraction of price setters, specied either à la Galì and Gertler (1999) or à la
Steinsson (2003)6. The representative households period utility, Ut  u (Ct; t) 
Z 1
0
v(ht(i); t)di
7, can be
approximated to second order as in Woodford (2003, 2:13, p. 396)
Ut =  Y euc
2

( 1 +$)(xt   x)2 + (1 +$)vari log pt(i)

+ t:i:p+O
y;e; %3 (1)
where  1 > 0 measures the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of aggregate expenditure,
$ > 0 denotes the elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to rms own output, and  > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution between goods. The term t:i:p collect terms that are independent of monetary
policy, namely irrelevant to the welfare ranking of alternative equilibria. The third-order residual is a
function of the parameter, y, which summarises the distortions in the natural steady-state level of output,
denoted by Y , that are brought about by monopolistic competition, the vector of exogenous disturbances,e, and the parameter vector that indexes aspects of policy that determine steady-state values of ination
and output gap, %8. By output gap, xt, we mean the log-di¤erence between the actual level of output
and the natural level of output, that is the equilibrium level of output that obtains under monopolistic
competition and perfectly exible prices. x denotes the steady-state e¢ ciency gap, namely the constant
over time gap between the steady-state e¢ cient level of output, which is the equilibrium level of output
that obtains under perfect competition and perfectly exible prices, and the steady-state natural level of
output.
6A description of the model used here, apart from Woodford (2003), can also be found in Pontiggia (2007), which presents
detailed derivations of the aggregate-supply relations and the central banks loss functions under backward-looking rule-of-
thumb behaviour by price setters. Indeed, the hybrid Phillips curve and the central banks objective in the case of backward-
looking rule-of-thumb behaviour a là Steinsson (2003) correct the ones reported in Steinsson (2003).
7The period utility is postulated to be separable in consumption and labour e¤ort. Ct is the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
aggregate of the households consumption of each of the individual goods that are supplied, which are indexed by i over the
unit interval. t is a vector of exogenous real shocks, namely exogenous shocks to households impatience to consume and to
the households willingness to supply labour. ht(i) is the supply of type i labour. For any given realisation of t, the period
utility function, u (Ct; t), is assumed to be concave and strictly increasing in Ct whereas the period disutility of supplying
labour of type i, v(ht(i); t), is assumed to be convex and increasing in ht(i).
8euc denotes the partial derivative, evaluated at steady state, of the indirect utility function, eu(Yt;et), with respect to the
level of production.
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In addition to stabilising output gap, around a level that exceeds the ine¢ cient natural level of output
by the steady-state e¢ ciency gap, it is hence also appropriate for monetary policy to aim to curb price
dispersion across goods, vari log pt(i). This is achieved by stabilising the aggregate price level, but how
uctuations in the general price level a¤ect price dispersion, hence welfare, depend upon the details of the
price setting.
Following the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy, we assume that the central banks
policy instrument is the short-term nominal interest rate, which reects the actual practice of monetary
policy by central banks. The combination of cashless economy, namely there are no costs associated with
varying the nominal interest rate, and centrals bank control of the nominal interest rate implies that the
policy problem is fully characterised by the aggregate-supply relation and the central banks loss function.
Given the central banks optimal choices for ination and output gap, the aggregate-demand relation simply
determines the path of nominal interest rate necessary to achieve the optimal path for the output gap.
On the one hand, both the central banks loss function, Lt, and the aggregate-supply relation depend
upon the details of the price setting. On the other hand, regardless of the details of the price setting, the
discounted sum of utility of the representative household equals to second order the discounted sum of
central banks loss function. The utility-based central banks objective function at an arbitrary time t = 0
is in fact given by
W = E0
1X
t=0
tUt =  
(1  )E0
1X
t=0
tLt + t:i:p+O
y;e; %;1=2 1 3 (2)
where E0 denotes the expectations operator conditional on information up through date 0, 0 <   1 is
the discount factor and the constant 
 is given by 
 = Y euc( 1 +$)=29.
Generally, a central bank acting under commitment faces the problem of minimising welfare losses
from period 0 forward subject to the constraint that the evolution of ination and output gap represent a
possible rational-expectation equilibrium. Woodford (1999), Clarida et al. (1999), and Erceg et al. (2000),
among others, follow Taylor (1979) in measuring policy performance by reporting average values of the
welfare criterion (2), that is values of the unconditional expectation of (2). The law of iterated expectations
entails that welfare is still given by (2) where the conditional expectation operator E0 is replaced by the
unconditional expectation operator E, namely W =  
(1   )EP1t=0 tLt. Except for discounting, this
measure corresponds to the unconditional expectation of the central banks loss function. Indeed, Blake
(2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) point out that the undiscounted problem, under which the central
9The third-order residual is also a function of the initial degree of price dispersion,  1.
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bank minimises W =  
(1  )EP1t=0 Lt, implies an alternative timelessly optimal rule which is globally
optimal with respect to the unconditional expectation of the central banks objective function.
In what follows, superscripts FL, GG, and S denote respectively the purely forward-looking New
Keynesian model, the model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999), and the model
with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003). Superscript Z denotes the zero-optimal commitment
policy, superscript W designates Woodfords (1999) timeless perspective policy, and superscript BJM
indicates the timeless perspective policy put forward by Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002).
We can now proceed to characterise each commitment policy in terms of target criterion and optimal
long-run ination target.
2.1 Basic New Keynesian Model
Given Calvo (1983) constraints on price setting, forward-looking behaviour by all price setters implies an
aggregate-supply relation of the form
t = Ett+1 + xt (3)
whereas the central banks loss function is given by
Lt = 
2
t + (xt   x)2 (4)
where t is the aggregate ination rate. The output gap coe¢ cient, , in (3) is a function of the models
structural parameters, namely
 =
(1  )(1  )( 1 +$)
(1 +$)
(5)
where 0 <  < 1 is the degree of price stickiness, that is the constant probability a rm faces in each period
of not resetting her price. The coe¢ cient on output uctuations in (4) is given by  = =.
A central bank acting under commitment faces the problem of choosing bounded paths for ination
and the output gap, ft; xtg1t=0, to minimise the discounted sum of losses subject to the constraint that
the sequences must satisfy (3) each period. The Lagrangian associated with this problem is of the form
L0 = E0
1X
t=0
t

1
2
2t +

2
(xt   x)2 + 't [t   t+1   xt]

(6)
where 't is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with period t aggregate-supply relation
10. Di¤erentiating
10Note that in what follows, given the law of iterated expectations, we replace Ett+1 with t+1 when writing the period t
8
with respect to t and xt, we get the two rst-order conditions
@L0
@t
= 0) t + 't   't 1 = 0 (7)
@L0
@xt
= 0) (xt   x)  't = 0 (8)
Under zero-optimal commitment policy, there is no fulllment of the expectations existing at the time of
the policy implementation, that is (7) in period 0 holds with ' 1 = 0. Hence, zero-optimal commitment
policy is characterised by the optimality conditions (8) for all t  0 and
t + 't = 0 t = 0 (9)
t + 't   't 1 = 0 t  1 (10)
Combining (8) with (9) delivers the central banks target criterion in period 0
0 =  

(x0   x) (11)
whereas combining (8) with (10), the central bank in any period t  1 behaves according to
t =  

(xt   xt 1) (12)
Woodford (2003) hence concludes
Thus it is optimal (from the point of minimizing discounted losses from date zero onward) to
arrange an initial ination, given that the decision to do so can have no e¤ect upon expectations
prior to date zero (if one is not bothered by the non-time-consistency of such a principle of
action). The optimal policy involves positive ination in subsequent periods as well, but there
should be a commitment to reduce ination to its optimal long-run value of zero asymptotically.
Woodford (2003, p. 414  5).
Despite the ine¢ ciency of the nonstochastic steady state, namely x > 0, and the existence of a
positively sloped long-run Phillips-curve trade-o¤, as implied by (3) evaluated at steady state, there is in
fact an advantage for having positive ination only in period 0, whereas there is no long-run incentive for
aggregate-supply relation.
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positive ination. This is because the increase in output in any period caused by higher ination in the
same period, 't, is exactly o¤set by the cost of the reduction in output in the previous period as a result of
expected higher ination, 't 1. The steady-state e¢ ciency gap thus enters (11), but it does not appear in
(12). Hence, the optimal long-run ination target is zero. Indeed, integrating forward the NKPC implies
that, regardless of policy, the discounted sum of future output gaps can be rewritten as a function solely
ination at time 0, 0 = E0
P1
t=0 
txt. Accordingly, the discounted sum of losses in (2) can be rewritten
as
E0
( 1X
t=0
tLt
)
= E0
( 1X
t=0
tx2
)
  2x


0 + E0
( 1X
t=0
t

2t + x
2
t
)
(13)
with the rst term on the right-hand side indicating a loss that is independent of monetary policy. All
the other terms, which depend on monetary policy, are minimised by choosing t = 0 each period, which
implies xt = 0 each period, except the one proportional to x. The presence of this term implies a welfare
gain from an initial positive rate of ination, but because it only applies to ination in the initial period,
it is optimal to commit to zero long-run ination. Moreover, the linear term in 0 a¤ects the zero-optimal
commitment policy for periods later than 0 as the NKPC implies an intertemporal linkage between current
ination and future ination. The welfare gain resulting from positive 0 can be obtained with less increase
in period 0 output gap, x0, thus resulting in less increase in x20, if it is associated with an increase in
expected ination at date one, E01. Given that the loss associated with E01 occurs later in time, and is
thus weighted less strongly, the transition to zero-optimal ination lasts for more than one period.
Woodford (1999) and Clarida et al. (1999) argue convincingly that zero-optimal commitment policy is
not attractive as it implies time variance in terms of the policy reaction function. Indeed, Woodford (1999)
puts forward another commitment policy, which he labels timeless perspective. The policy proposal is
simple to outline. What makes the zero-optimal commitment policy time-variant is the separate treatment
of initial period and all other periods. At time 0, the central bank sets ination according to (11) and
promises to set (12) at any later date. Yet, if a central bank reoptimised in any later period, it would nd
optimal to set ination according to (11), updated to that period. By ignoring the conditions existing in
the economy at the policys implementation, commitment policy is in fact timeless, namely time-invariant,
as it can be thought as a policy rule that was chosen in the distant past, and the current values of ination
and output gap are the values chosen form that earlier perspective to satisfy the two conditions (7) and
(8). Woodfords timeless perspective commitment policy thus ignores the start-up condition (9) and the
central banks target criterion in all periods t  0 is given by (12). Hence, despite x > 0, there is never
advantage from having positive ination.
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More recently, it has been recognised that the use of (12) in all periods t  0 is not optimal within
the class of time-invariant policy rules. Specically, Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) show
that there is a slightly di¤erent policy rule that is globally optimal with respect to the unconditional
expectation of the central banks objective function. This alternative timeless perspective policy implies
that the central bank solves the undiscounted constrained control problem, namely (6) becomes
L0 = E0
1X
t=0

1
2
2t +

2
(xt   x)2 + 't [t   t+1   xt]

(14)
Di¤erentiating with respect to t and xt, (8) is una¤ected but instead of (7) we obtain
@L0
@t
= 0) t + 't   't 1 = 0 (15)
From a timeless perspective, the central bank sets policy according to (8) and (15) in all periods t  0.
Combining the rst order conditions, the central banks target criterion is given by
t =  

(xt   xt 1) + (1  )

x (16)
Comparing (16) with (12), we note that this alternative time-invariant policy rule brings about an incentive
for committing to positive ination. Specically, evaluating (16) at steady state delivers
 +
(1  )

x =
(1  )

x (17)
Given the upward sloping relationship between steady-state output gap, x, and steady-state ination, ,
implied by (3)
x =
(1  )

 (18)
the timeless perspective policy put forward by Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) entails
positive steady-state ination of the form
FLBJM =
(1  )
+ (1  )2x
 (19)
which collapses to zero in the absence of long-run Phillips curve trade o¤ (i.e.  = 1) and in the absence
of steady-state distortions (i.e. x = 0).
The logic behind this result is quite intuitive, hinging on the discount factor. If the central bank shares
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the same discount factor of the private sector, the cost resulting from the anticipation of higher ination
occurs earlier in time and it is thus weighted more strongly (by a factor 1= > 1) than the benet stemming
from higher ination (weighted by a factor 1). However, expected future ination enters the NKPC with a
coe¢ cient  that is smaller than the unitary coe¢ cient on actual ination. Hence, as in (12), the increase
in output in any period caused by higher ination in the same period, 't, is o¤set by the cost of the
reduction in output in the previous period as a result of expected higher ination, 't 1. Accordingly, there
is no long-run incentive for positive ination and optimal steady-state ination is zero. Under Blake (2001)
and Jensen and McCallum (2002) timeless perspective policy, the central banks discount factor di¤ers
from the private sectors discount factor. Specically, the private sector prefers current consumption to
future one (PS   < 1), whereas the central bank does not discount the future, namely every loss is
equally costly for the central bank (CB = 1).On the one hand, the private sectors discount factor appears
in the models structural equations, thus resulting in the long-run Phillips curve trade-o¤. On the other
hand, the central bank now equally weighs the increase in output in any period caused by higher ination
in the same period and the cost of the reduction in output in the previous period as a result of expected
higher ination. Hence, the stimulative e¤ect of higher ination on output is greater than the output cost
of higher ination. The long-run Phillips curve trade-o¤ is then exploited and it is optimal for the central
bank to commit to positive steady-state ination.
2.2 Rule-of-thumb behaviour
We now proceed to compare the three alternative commitment policies when the Phillips curve becomes
hybrid due to the presence of backward-looking rule-of-thumb price setters. We consider rst rule-of-
thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999) and subsequently turn our attention to Steinssons (2003)
rule-of-thumb behaviour. In both cases, we formalise the policy problem and we characterise the three
commitment policies in terms of target criterion and optimal long-run ination target.
2.2.1 Rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler
Given Calvo (1983) constraints on price setting, backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and
Gertler (1999) by a fraction ! of rms implies an aggregate-supply relation of the form
t = fEtt+1 + bt 1 + 1xt (20)
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whereas the central banks loss function is given by
Lt = 
2
t + 1(xt   x)2 + 2(t   t 1)2 (21)
The coe¢ cients in the hybrid Phillips curve are given by f = 
 1, ; b = !
 1, and 1 = (1  !) 1
with  = [+ !   (1  )!]. The coe¢ cients in the central banks loss function are given by 1   and
2 = ! [(1  !)] 1.
A central bank acting under commitment faces the problem of choosing bounded paths for ination
and the output gap, ft; xtg1t=0, to minimise the discounted sum of losses subject to the constraint that
the sequences must satisfy (20) each period. The Lagrangian associated with this problem is of the form
L0 = E0
1X
t=0
t

1
2

2t + 1(xt   x)2 + 2(t   t 1)2

+ 't

t   ft+1   bt 1   1xt

(22)
Di¤erentiating with respect to t and xt, we get the two rst-order conditions
@L0
@t
= 0) t + 2(t   t 1)  2(t+1   t) + 't   f't 1   b't+1 = 0 (23)
@L0
@xt
= 0) 1(xt   x)  1't = 0 (24)
Under zero-optimal commitment policy, (23) in period 0 holds with ' 1 = 0. Hence, zero-optimal
commitment policy is characterised by the optimality conditions (24) for all t  0 and
t + 2(t   t 1)  2(t+1   t) + 't   b't+1 = 0 t = 0 (25)
t + 2(t   t 1)  2(t+1   t) + 't   f't 1   b't+1 = 0 t  1 (26)
Combining (24) with (25) delivers the central banks target criterion in period 0
0 =
1
1 + 2(1 + )

2 1 + 21 +
1
1
[bx1   x0 + (1  b)x]

(27)
whereas combining (24) with (26), the central bank in any period t  1 behaves according to
t =
1
1 + 2(1 + )

2t 1 + 2t+1 +
1
1

bxt+1 + fxt 1   xt + (1  b   f )x

(28)
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Under Woodfords timeless perspective commitment policy, the start-up condition (25) is ignored and
the central banks target criterion in all periods t  0 is given by (28). Note that, as implied by (27) and
(28), central banks behaviour now depends on the economys rate of ination prior to the adoption of the
optimal policy,  1. Moreover, given x > 0, there is an advantage for having positive ination not only in
period 0 but in any other period as well. Indeed, Pontiggia (2007) shows that the positive optimal long-run
ination target, which equally obtains under zero-optimal and the standard timeless perspective policy, is
given by11
GGWZ =
(1  )(1  )!
(1  !)+ (1  )(1  )2!x
 (29)
Under Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) timeless perspective policy, the central bank
solves the undiscounted constrained control problem, namely (22) becomes
L0 = E0
1X
t=0

1
2

2t + 1(xt   x)2 + 2(t   t 1)2

+ 't

t   ft+1   bt 1   1xt

(30)
Di¤erentiating with respect to t and xt, (24) is una¤ected but instead of (23) we obtain
@L0
@t
= 0) t + 2(t   t 1)  2(t+1   t) + 't   f't 1   b't+1 = 0 (31)
From a timeless perspective, the central bank sets policy according to (24) and (31) in all periods t  0.
Combining the rst order conditions, the central banks target criterion is given by
t =
1
1 + 22

2t 1 + 2t+1 +
1
1

bxt+1 + fxt 1   xt + (1  b   f)x

(32)
which again depends on the economys rate of ination prior to the adoption of the optimal policy.
Evaluating (32) at steady state delivers (17). This is because rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and
Gertler (1999) desirably implies that all price setters behave identically once shocks are eliminated from
the economy. Indeed, Galì-Gertlers backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour does not alter the steady
state that would obtain under forward-looking behaviour by all price setters, neither in terms of long-run
Phillips-curve trade-o¤ nor in terms of steady-state central banks loss function. Hence, the alternative
11This is found by combining the target criterion with the hybrid Phillips curve, all evaluated at steady state. See Pontiggia
(2007) for details of the derivation. Optimal steady-state ination collapses to zero in the absence of backward-looking rule-of-
thumb behaviour (i.e. ! = 0), in the absence of long-run Phillips curve trade o¤ (i.e.  = 1), and in the absence of steady-state
distortions (i.e. x = 0).
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timeless perspective commitment policy is robust to the introduction of backward-looking rule-of thumb
behaviour, when this is characterised as in Galì and Gertler (1999), with the optimal long-run ination
target being invariant to the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
2.2.2 Rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson
Given Calvo (1983) constraints on price setting, backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson
(2003) by a fraction ! of rms implies an aggregate-supply relation of the form
t = fEtt+1 + bt 1 + 2xt + 3xt 1 (33)
whereas the central banks loss function is given by
Lt = 
2
t + 1(xt   x)2 + 2 [t   (t 1 + (1  )xt 1)]2 (34)
with 2 = [(1  !)  (1  )!] 1 and 3 = (1 )! 1. The structural parameter  denotes the
degree of indexation to lagged output gap by rule-of-thumb price setters.
A central bank acting under commitment faces the problem of choosing bounded paths for ination
and the output gap, ft; xtg1t=0, to minimise the discounted sum of losses subject to the constraint that
the sequences must satisfy (33) each period. The Lagrangian associated with this problem is of the form
L0 = E0
1X
t=0
t
8><>:
1
2
2
t +
1
2 (xt   x)2 + 22 [t   (t 1 + (1  )xt 1)]2
+'t

t   ft+1   bt 1   2xt   3xt 1

9>=>; (35)
Di¤erentiating with respect to t and xt, we get the two rst-order conditions
@L0
@t
= 0)
8><>: t + 't   f't 1   b't+1+2 [t   (t 1 + (1  )xt 1)]  2 [t+1   (t + (1  )xt)]
9>=>; = 0 (36)
@L0
@xt
= 0) 1(xt   x)  2(1  ) [t+1   (t + (1  )xt)]  2't   3't+1 = 0 (37)
Under zero-optimal commitment policy, (36) in period 0 holds with ' 1 = 0. Hence, zero-optimal com-
mitment policy is characterised by the optimality conditions (37) for all t  0 and
t + 2 [t   (t 1 + (1  )xt 1)]  2 [t+1   (t + (1  )xt)] + 't   b't+1 = 0 t = 0 (38)
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8><>: t + 't   f't 1   b't+1+2 [t   (t 1 + (1  )xt 1)]  2 [t+1   (t + (1  )xt)]
9>=>; = 0 t  1 (39)
Combining (37) with (38) delivers the central banks target criterion in period 0
0(1 + 2) = 2 ( 1 + (1  )x 1) + 1
(1  ) (x0   x
) + (b  
3
(1  ) )| {z }
0
'1   (
2
(1  ) + 1)'0 (40)
whereas combining (37) with (39), the central bank in any period t  1 behaves according to
t =
1
1 + 2

2 (t 1 + (1  )xt 1) + 1
(1  ) (xt   x
) 

2
(1  ) + 1

't + f't 1

(41)
Given the intertemporal nature of (37), the central banks target criterion cannot in fact be expressed as
a function of ination and output gap only. The Lagrangian multiplier becomes an additional endogenous
variable, but, in any period, the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the subsequent period aggregate-
supply relation does not enter the target criterion. This is because, as shown in (40), the coe¢ cient on the
Lagrangian multiplier associated with the subsequent period hybrid Phillips curve is constantly equal to
zero. It follows that analysing monetary policy in the presence of rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson
(2003) requires considering the two rst-order conditions separately.
Under Woodfords timeless perspective commitment policy, the start-up condition (38) is ignored and
the central banks target criterion in all periods t  0 is given by (41). Note that, as implied by (41),
central banks behaviour now depends both on output gap and ination existing prior to the adoption of the
optimal policy, x 1 and  1. Moreover, given x > 0, there is an advantage for having positive ination not
only in period 0 but in any other period as well. Indeed, Pontiggia (2007) shows that the positive optimal
long-run ination target, which equally obtains under zero-optimal and the standard timeless perspective
policy, is given by12
SWZ =
(1  )(1  ) 1! [(1  !)+ (1  )(1  )!]8><>: (1  !)(1  )(
 1   )(1  )2!+
(1  !)+ (1  )2! [(1  !)+ (1  )(1  )!]
9>=>;
x  	x (42)
12This is found by combining the rst-order conditions with the hybrid Phillips curve, all evaluated at steady state. See
Pontiggia (2007) for details of the derivation. Optimal steady-state ination collapses to zero in the absence of backward-
looking rule-of-thumb behaviour (i.e. ! = 0), in the absence of long-run Phillips curve trade o¤ (i.e.  = 1), and in the
absence of steady-state distortions (i.e. x = 0).
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Under Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) timeless perspective policy, the central bank
solves the undiscounted constrained control problem, namely (35) becomes
L0 = E0
1X
t=0
8><>:
1
2
2
t +
1
2 (xt   x)2 + 22 [t   (t 1 + (1  )xt 1)]2
+'t

t   ft+1   bt 1   2xt   3xt 1

9>=>; (43)
Di¤erentiating with respect to t and xt, both rst-order conditions are a¤ected. (36) becomes
@L0
@t
= 0)
8><>: t + 't   f't 1   b't+1+2 [t   (t 1 + (1  )xt 1)]  2 [t+1   (t + (1  )xt)]
9>=>; = 0 (44)
whereas (37) becomes
@L0
@xt
= 0) 1(xt   x)  2(1  ) [t+1   (t + (1  )xt)]  2't   3't+1 = 0 (45)
From a timeless perspective, the central bank sets policy according to (44) and (45) in all periods t  0.
Combining the rst order conditions, the central banks target criterion is given by
t =
1
1 + 2

2 (t 1 + (1  )xt 1) + 1
(1  ) (xt   x
) 

2
(1  ) + 1

't + f't 1

(46)
which again depends on the economys rate of ination and output gap prior to the adoption of the optimal
policy. (33) evaluated at steady state implies an upward sloping relationship between steady-state output
gap and steady-state ination of the form
x =
(1  )(1  !)
(1  !)+ (1  )(1  )!    (47)
Combining (47) with the steady-state version of (44) and (45), the alternative timeless perspective policy
implies positive steady-state ination of the form13
SBJM =
[(1  !)+ (1  )(1  )!] (1  )(1  !)
 [(1  !)+ (1  )(1  )!]2 + (1  !)+ (1  )22! (1  )2(1  !)x  x
(48)
If the rule-of thumb is characterised as in Steinsson (2003), the optimal long-run ination target under
the alternative timeless perspective commitment policy ceases to be the same as in the purely forward-
13Under  = 0, optimal steady-state ination collapses to (19).
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looking New Keynesian model. Steinssons (2003) rule-of-thumb behaviour in fact alters both the long-run
trade-o¤ between output gap and ination and the steady-state loss function that obtain in the absence of
backward-looking behaviour.
Table 1 summarises the results as for the optimal long-run ination target, evincing the relationship
between the six targets derived. The optimal steady-state ination target is indeed positive in all but one
of the theoretical cases studied.
3 Quantitative Analysis
In evaluating welfare, our main objective is, as in Jensen and McCallum (2002), to simply rank the
alternative commitment policies. Evaluating welfare requires specifying values for the economys structural
parameters. Four parameters (, , $,  1) are chosen to equal those used in Woodford (2003, p. 431),
which stem from the estimation results in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). These values are given in Table
2. The steady-state e¢ ciency gap, x, is accordingly set equal to 0:214. In the absence of an empirical
estimate for the degree of indexation to lagged output gap, , by rule-of-thumb price setters, we follow
Steinsson (2003) and set it to 0:052.
The remaining two structural parameters are in fact the key models primitives: the average duration
that an individual price is xed, namely the degree of price stickiness, , and the fraction of rms that
reset prices in a backward-looking manner, that is the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, !. Galì and
Gertler (1999) report estimates of ! between 0:077 and 0:552, with 3 of their 6 estimates between 0:2 and
0:3. As for the degree of price stickiness, empirically realistic values of the average price duration based on
macroeconomic data vary between 2 and 5 quarters, namely 0:5    0:8. Available empirical estimates
using microeconomic data, as in Bils and Klenow (2004), suggest instead a lower average price duration of
around 1:5 quarters, that is a value of  of about 0:33. We thus consider 0:33    0:8 and extend the
range for the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour up to 0:7, namely 0:01  !  0:7, as ! = 0:7 implies that
the hybrid Phillips curve under rule-of-thumb behaviour, regardless of its specication, puts equal weight
on future expected ination and lagged ination. In the presence of rule-of-thumb behaviour by price
setters, we pick  = 0:66, namely an average price duration of 3 quarters, and ! = 0:3 as our benchmark
values because they both sit in the middle of the respective range of available empirical estimates15.
14The value is implied by the denition of x, x = y=($+ 1), with y = 1  (1  )=. See Pontiggia (2007) for further
details.
15The results presented below are una¤ected if one were to consider di¤erent benchmark estimates for both  and !.
Specically, we have considered limiting values for ! (i.e. ! = 0:01 and ! = 0:7) when analysing robustness with respect to 
and limiting values for  (i.e.  = 0:33 and  = 0:8) when studying robustness with respect to !.
18
We compare the alternative commitment policies both on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium and
on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium, with W denoting the level of welfare that obtains in the former.
Specically, we follow the cited papers and report average values of the central banks objective function.
That is, we evaluate alternative policies by taking the unconditional expectation of (2) with respect to the
distribution of exogenous shocks.
We assume that ination and output gap at time 0, as well as at time  1 under backward-looking
rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters, are at their unconditional expectation, namely at the long-run
values implied by the policy under consideration. This ensures that the desirability of the chosen plan for
ination and output gap does not depend upon conditions at time 0 and at time  1. Moreover, when we
compare policies on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium we also consider welfare conditional upon initial
conditions. Indeed, Jensen and McCallum (2002) point out the non-optimality of Woodfords timeless
perspective commitment policy on a conditional basis in the context of the purely forward-looking New
Keynesian model. In the presence of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters, we hence
analyse welfare conditional on ination and output gap at time 0, as well as at time  1, being at their
conditional value of zero. Following Erceg et al. (2000), we throughout express welfare as a proportion
of the steady-state level of output, namely 
 is now given by 
 = ( 1 + $)=2. Moreover, we report
percent welfare levels .
We consider rst welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium and we later turn our attention
to welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium.
3.1 Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium
3.1.1 Basic New Keynesian Model
Woodford (2003, Ch. 6) shows that the unique nonexplosive solution for the Lagrange multiplier in (6),
which is consistent with the zero-optimal commitment policy not fullling the period-minus-one Phillips
curve (i.e. ' 1 = 0), is of the form
't =  (1  ut+11 )


x (49)
where u1 < 1 is given by u1 =

   (2   4)0:5 =2 with  = 1 +  + (2=). Substituting this solution
for the multiplier in (7) implies that ination under the zero-optimal commitment policy evolves according
to
t = (1  u1)

ut1x
 (50)
19
Similarly, substituting (49) in (8), the path for output gap under the zero-optimal commitment policy is
given by
xt = u
t+1
1 x
 (51)
Substituting (50) and (51) into (4), yields the single-period loss function
LFLZt =

1 + (1  u1)2 
2
u2t1 + u
2(t+1)
1   2ut+11

x2 (52)
which implies that welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium is of the form
W
FLZ
=  
(1  )x2E
1X
t=0
t

1 + (1  u1)2 
2
u2t1 + u
2(t+1)
1   2ut+11

(53)
Given  < 1 and u1 < 1, all the terms entering the sums to innity are converging geometric series. Hence,
it is possible to eliminate the innite sums, so that (53) becomes
W
FLZ
=  (
 1 +$)
2
x2   (1  )(
 1 +$)
2
x2

1
1  u21

u21 +
(1  u1)2
2

  2u1
1  u1

(54)
Under the timeless perspective policy put forward by Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002),
welfare depends on monetary policy. Combining the steady-state loss function, L
FL
= 2 + (x   x)2,
with (19) and (18), yields
L
FLBJM
=
2
+ (1  )2x
2  1
[1 + (1  )2() 1]x
2 (55)
which implies that welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium is of the form
W
FLBJM
=  
LFLBJM    (
 1 +$)
2 [1 + (1  )2() 1]x
2 (56)
Under Woodfords timeless perspective commitment policy, welfare is independent of monetary policy,
with the steady-state loss function being given by
L
FLW
= x2 (57)
which implies that welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium is invariant to the degree of price
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stickiness, that is
W
FLW
=  
LFLW   (
 1 +$)
2
x2 (58)
Unsurprisingly, welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium under the alternative timeless
perspective policy is univocally better than the one under the standard timeless perspective policy as the
former is globally optimal with respect to the unconditional expectation of the central banks objective
function, namely
W
FLBJM
W
FLW
=
1
[1 + (1  )2() 1] < 1 (59)
Figure 1 plots W
FLZ
, W
FLW
, and W
FLBJM
for alternative values of the degree of price stickiness,
0:33    0:8, withWFLW not depending on . Zero-optimal commitment policy delivers the highest level
of welfare given that, as discussed above, the transition to the steady state is always welfare-enhancing.
Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium under both zero-optimal commitment policy and
the alternative timeless perspective commitment policy is monotically increasing in the degree of price
stickiness. This is consistent with the results presented in Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002),
which show that a greater weight on output uctuations is welfare-worsening. In the present framework,
the output gap coe¢ cient, , hence the coe¢ cient on output uctuation , is monotically decreasing in the
degree of price stickiness. Therefore, a higher average price duration results in better welfare on the basis
of the deterministic equilibrium.
It is relevant to note that using Soderlinds (1999) method, with the time horizon set to 1000 periods16,
to derive welfare under the zero-optimal policy delivers the same level of welfare that obtains under the
analytical solution, as given by (54), up to the seventh decimal gure, namely up to the fth decimal gure
when, as done here, welfare levels are expressed in percent terms.
3.1.2 Rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler
We do not attempt to analytically derive the evolution of ination and output gap under the zero-optimal
commitment policy, hence welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium, W
GGZ
, but we resort to
Soderlinds (1999) method.
Under both timeless perspective policies, the steady-state loss function, namely L
FL  LGG, can be seen
as the sum of the loss that obtains in the presence of zero long-run ination, L
FLW
, which is independent of
16Whenever we employ Soderlinds method, the time horizon is set to 1000 periods.
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monetary policy, and the loss attributable to positive optimal long-run ination , 2+1x2 21xx, which
depends on monetary policy. Hence, we are able to address whether positive long-run ination improves
welfare relative to a policy of zero ination at all times, which implies W
FLW
.
As described above, the alternative timeless perspective policy is robust to the introduction of backward-
looking rule-of thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999). It follows thatW
GGBJM WFLBJM , which
in univocally better than W
FLW
.
Under Woodfords timeless perspective policy, combining the steady-state loss function with (29) and
(18), yields
L
GGW
= 1x
2 + 1
(1  )(1  )2!
8><>:  [! + (!   2)] (1  )(1  )2!
9>=>;
[(1  !)+ (1  )(1  )2!]2 x
2  1x2(1 + ) (60)
which implies that welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium is of the form
W
GGW
=  (
 1 +$)
2
(1 + )x2 (61)
The standard timeless perspective policy is hence not univocally superior to a policy of a policy of zero
steady-state ination. The condition that guarantees W
GGW
> W
FLW
is easily seen to be  < 0, where
the sign of  is determined by the term in curly brackets in (60). Solving in terms of ! yields
!

(1 + )  (1  )(1  )2  2, !  2
[(1 + )  (1  )(1  )2] (62)
Figure 2 plots condition (62), holding with equality, for the full range of the degree of price stickiness,
0:01    0:99. The values of ! that imply WGGW < WFLW are observed to be outside the estimates
of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour reported in Galì and Gertler (1999), especially when considering
empirically realistic values of the degree of price stickiness based on macroeconomic data. However, while
the alternative timeless perspective policy is univocally superior, in terms of welfare on the basis of the
deterministic equilibrium, to a policy of zero ination at all times, the same it is not always true under the
standard timeless perspective policy.
Figure 3 plots W
GGZ
, W
GGW
, and W
GGBJM
for alternative values of the degree of price stickiness,
0:33    0:8. Given the relationship between  and , welfare on the basis of the deterministic
equilibrium under all commitment policies is increasing in the degree of price stickiness. Zero-optimal
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commitment policy ranks rst and the alternative timeless perspective commitment policy is conrmed to
entail welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium that is always better than the one implied by
the standard timeless perspective policy.
As for the relation between welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium and the degree of
backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour, Figure 4 plots W
GGZ
, W
GGW
, and W
GGBJM
for 0:01  ! 
0:7. Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) timeless perspective policy implies the same level of
welfare that obtains in the purely forward-looking model, which is invariant to the degree of rule-of-thumb
behaviour. Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium under zero-optimal policy is observed to
be monotonically decreasing in the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. Woodfords timeless perspective
policy instead implies that a larger fraction of rms resetting prices in a backward-looking rule-of-thumb
manner is initially welfare-enhancing, although never delivering better welfare levels than the alternative
timeless perspective commitment policy, and subsequently becomes welfare-worsening. With this latter
respect, Figure 5 plots, for the full range of the degree of price stickiness, the locus of combinations of
the degree of price stickiness and the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour such that W
GGW
is at its relative
maximum, with the absolute maximum obtaining under the outermost right combination of  and !. Once
again, zero-optimal policy is better than the two timeless perspective policies, with the alternative timeless
perspective policy being univocally superior to the standard timeless perspective policy.
3.1.3 Rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson
We do not attempt to analytically derive the evolution of ination and output gap under the zero-optimal
commitment policy, hence welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium, W
SZ
, but we resort to
Soderlinds (1999) method.
Steinssons (2003) rule-of-thumb behaviour alters both the long-run trade-o¤ between output gap and
ination and the steady-state loss function (i.e. L
S
= L
FL
+ 2(1   )22)x2) that obtain in the purely
forward-looking New Keynesian model. Under both timeless perspective policies, the steady-state loss
function can again be seen as the sum of the loss that obtains in the basic New Keynesian model, L
FLW
,
which is independent of monetary policy, and the loss due to positive long-run ination, 2+ (1+ 2(1 
)22)x2   21xx, which depends on monetary policy. Under the standard timeless perspective policy,
combining the steady-state loss function with (42) and (47), yields
L
SW
= 1x
2 +	x2

	  21  + (1 + 2(1  )22) 2	

(63)
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which implies that welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium is of the form
W
SW
=  (
 1 +$)
2
L
SW
(64)
Under the alternative timeless perspective policy, combining the steady-state loss function with (48)
and (47), yields
L
SBJM
= 1x
2 +x2

  21  + (1 + 2(1  )22) 2

(65)
which implies that welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium is of the form
W
SBJM
=  (
 1 +$)
2
L
SB
(66)
As under Galì-Gertlers rule-of-thumb behaviour, we can compare welfare under positive optimal steady-
state ination vis-a-vis welfare under a policy of zero steady-state ination. However, the derivation of the
condition that guarantees an increase in welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium is cumbersome,
but quantitative analysis conrms that the timeless perspective in Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum
(2002) is univocally superior, in terms of welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium, to a policy
of zero ination at all times, whereas the same it is not always true under Woodfords timeless perspective
policy.
The results that obtain under backward-looking rule-of thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999)
are una¤ected. Figure 6 plot respectively W
SZ
, W
SW
, and W
SBJM
for alternative values of the degree of
price stickiness, 0:33    0:8. Given that the coe¢ cient on output uctuation is monotically decreasing
in the degree of price stickiness, welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium under all commitment
policies is increasing in the degree of price stickiness. Zero-optimal commitment policy ranks rst and
the alternative timeless perspective commitment policy is conrmed to entail welfare on the basis of the
deterministic equilibrium that is always better than the one implied by the standard timeless perspective
policy.
As for the relation between welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium and the degree
of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour, Figure 7 plot respectively W
SZ
, W
SW
, and W
SBJM
for
0:01  !  0:7. Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium under both zero-optimal policy and
Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) timeless perspective policy is observed to be monotonically
decreasing in the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. Woodfords timeless perspective policy implies that
a larger fraction of rms resetting prices in a backward-looking rule-of-thumb manner is associated ini-
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tially with increases in welfare, although never equalling welfare levels entailed by the alternative timeless
perspective commitment policy, and subsequently becomes welfare-worsening. Indeed, Figure 8 plots, for
the full range of the degree of price stickiness, the locus of combinations of the degree of price stickiness
and the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour such that W
SW
is at its relative maximum, with the absolute
maximum obtaining under the outermost right combination of  and !. Once again, zero-optimal policy is
better than the the two timeless perspective policies, with the alternative timeless perspective policy being
univocally superior to the standard timeless perspective policy.
3.2 Welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium
Having shown how the alternative commitment policies univocally rank on the basis of the deterministic
equilibrium, we now follow the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy and proceed to evaluate
policies on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium, which stems from augmenting the aggregate-supply
relation with a cost-push shock. For instance, the NKPC is now given by
t = Ett+1 + xt + t (67)
where, using the terminology in Clarida et al. (1999), t represents a cost-push shock, which is assumed
to be autoregressive of order one with AR parameter  and innovation shock t being i.i.d, namely t =
t 1 + t17. We calibrate the standard deviation of the cost-push shock innovation to 0:016, which is the
value estimated in Smets and Wouters (2003) and we set the AR parameter, , to 018. Augmenting the
aggregate-supply relation with a cost-push shock does not alter the central banks target criterion, but it
implies that the monetary authority should react to movements in output which are caused by a cost-push
shock while it should not react to movements in output which are caused by any other shocks19.
The experiment we undertake in order to rank the alternative commitment policies on the basis of
the stochastic equilibrium is simple to illustrate. We consider a draw of 100 positive cost-push shocks,
which we maintain across all the theoretical cases studied20. For each (; !) pair we calculate welfare
as the mean value that obtains across the 100 shocks. From this level of welfare we then subtract the
17Of course, (20) and (33) are also augmented with t.
18The same remark in Jensen and McCallum (2002) applies here, changing the standard deviation of the mark-up shock
innovation would only scale welfare values up or down proportionately. The results we present are robust to the possibility of
a positive AR parameter. Specically, we have considered  = 0:5 and  = 0:8.
19The model includes exogenous real shocks to technology, to Government purchases, to households impatience to consume,
and to the households willingness to supply labour.
20The results we report are not altered when considering a larger number of shocks. Specically, we have considered a draw
of 1000 positive cost-push shocks.
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corresponding welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium, thus reporting welfare that is purely
due to the stabilisation of the cost-push shock.
Soderlinds (1999) method solves for the evolution of endogenous variables under zero-optimal com-
mitment policy. However, it can be used for the evolution of the endogenous variables under timeless
perspective policy on the provision that a dummy control variable is introduced into the system. That is,
while under zero-optimal policy the output gap is the control variable and the central banks only constraint
is the aggregate-supply relation, under timeless perspective policy the control variable equals zero at all
times and the central bank is constrained by the aggregate-supply relation and the target criterion21.
3.2.1 Basic New Keynesian Model
Figure 9 plots welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium under the three commitment policies
for alternative values of the degree of price stickiness, 0:33    0:8. Under all policies, welfare is
monotonically decreasing in the degree of price stickiness. This is contrary to the relation between welfare
on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium and degree of price stickiness, but the logic for this result is
quite intuitive. In an economy where price setting is staggered, a higher degree of price stickiness implies a
higher degree of price dispersion, which is in fact costly as it brings about dispersion of output levels across
goods22. Hence, a higher average price duration results in larger losses associated with the stabilisation of
the cost-push shock.
Figure 9 is rather inconclusive as for how the three commitment policies rank in terms of welfare on
the basis of the stochastic equilibrium. Figure 10 thus reports the di¤erence in welfare levels between
any pair of commitment policies. As in Jensen and McCallum (2002), the magnitude of the di¤erences in
welfare levels is, here as well as in the presence of rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters, not large, but,
insofar as the solution method in Soderlind (1999) is accurate up to the fth decimal gure, is distinctly
non-zero23. The ranking between the alternative commitment policies is then univocal: the alternative
timeless perspective policy ranks rst, followed by the standard timeless perspective policy and both
timeless perspective policies outperform the zero-optimal policy.
21As described above, under rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003), the target criterion is replaced by the rst-order
conditions with respect to ination and output gap
22The degree of price dispersion at time t in the purely forward-looking model is given by t = t 1 + (1 )
2
t +
O
1=2 1 ;e; %2, which is easily seen to be increasing in .
23 In what follows, a di¤erence in welfare levels of order up to 10 5 is thus considered to be distinctly non-zero.
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3.2.2 Rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler
Figure 11 plots welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium under the three commitment policies
for alternative values of the degree of price stickiness, 0:33    0:8. Under all policies, welfare is
monotonically decreasing in the degree of price stickiness. This is because, as in the purely forward-looking
model, a higher degree of price stickiness implies a higher degree of price dispersion, hence larger welfare
losses. The ranking between the alternative commitment policies, as depicted in Figure 12, is not univocal.
On the one hand, both timeless perspective policies outperform the zero-optimal policy. On the other hand,
the standard timeless perspective policy is observed to be superior to the alternative timeless perspective
policy for 0:33    0:54, with the di¤erence being distinctly non-zero for 0:38    0:49. Higher
degrees of price stickiness, namely 0:55    0:8, instead imply that the alternative timeless perspective
policy outperforms the standard timeless perspective policy.
Figure 13 plots welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium under the three commitment policies
for alternative values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, 0:01  !  0:7. Under all policies, welfare
is monotonically decreasing in the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. A larger fraction of rms resetting
prices in a backward-looking is indeed associated with higher degree of price dispersion, hence larger losses
associated with the stabilisation of the cost-push shock24. The ranking between the alternative commitment
policies, as depicted in Figure 14, is not univocal. On the one hand, the standard timeless perspective policy
is invariably superior to the zero-optimal policy. On the other hand, the alternative timeless perspective
policy is seen to be inferior to the other two commitment policies for relatively high degree of rule-of-thumb
behaviour. Specically, the zero-optimal policy outperforms the alternative timeless perspective policy for
0:48  !  0:62, with the di¤erence being distinctly non-zero for 0:49  !  0:61, whereas the standard
timeless perspective policy is superior to its alternative version for 0:4  !  0:64, with the di¤erence
being distinctly non-zero for 0:42  !  0:64.
Note that backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour implies inferior welfare on the basis of the sto-
chastic equilibrium than in the purely forward-looking model. Intuitively, backward-looking rule-of-thumb
behaviour invariably increases the degree of price dispersion, which results in additional welfare losses
associated with the stabilisation of the cost-push shock.
Finally, we consider welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium on a conditional basis. Specif-
ically, we analyse welfare conditional on ination and output gap at time 0, as well as at time  1, being
24The degree of price dispersion at time t in the model with rule-of-thumb à la Galì and Gertler (1999) is given by t =
t 1 + (1 )
2
t +
!
(1 !)(1 ) (t   t 1)2 +O
1=2 1 ;e; %2, which is easily seen to be increasing in both  and !.
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at their conditional value of zero. There is one main point to take from Figures (15)-(18), which are
analogous to Figures (11)-(14). While the welfare levels on a conditional basis are practically the same as
on an unconditional basis, the ranking between the alternative commitment policies is now univocal: the
alternative timeless perspective policy ranks rst, followed by the standard timeless perspective policy and
both timeless perspective policies outperform the zero-optimal policy25.
3.2.3 Rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson
Figure 19 plots welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium under the three commitment policies
for alternative values of the degree of price stickiness, 0:33    0:8. Under all policies, welfare is
monotonically decreasing in the degree of price stickiness as a higher degree of price stickiness implies
a higher degree of price dispersion, hence larger welfare losses. The ranking between the alternative
commitment policies, as depicted in Figure 20, is univocal: the alternative timeless perspective policy
ranks rst, followed by the standard timeless perspective policy and both timeless perspective policies
outperform the zero-optimal policy.
Figure 21 plots welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium under the three commitment policies
for alternative values of the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, 0:01  !  0:7. Under all policies, welfare
is monotonically decreasing in the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour. A larger fraction of rms resetting
prices in a backward-looking is indeed associated with higher degree of price dispersion, hence larger losses
associated with the stabilisation of the cost-push shock26. The ranking between the alternative commitment
policies, as depicted in Figure 22, is not univocal. On the one hand, both timeless perspective policies
are invariably superior to the zero-optimal policy. On the other hand, the alternative timeless perspective
policy is seen to be inferior to its standard version for relatively high degrees of rule-of-thumb behaviour.
Specically, the standard timeless perspective policy outperforms the alternative timeless perspective policy
for 0:47  !  0:58, with the di¤erence being distinctly non-zero only for 0:51  !  0:55.
Note that backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003) implies superior welfare on
the basis of the stochastic equilibrium than under rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999).
Intuitively, indexation to lagged output gap curbs the degree of price dispersion, which results in smaller
welfare losses associated with the stabilisation of the cost-push shock.
25 Indeed, the standard timeless perspective policy is superior to its alternative version only for extremely high degrees of
rule-of-thumb behaviour, namely !  0:68.
26The degree of price dispersion at time t in the model with rule-of-thumb à la Steinsson (2003) is given by t = t 1 +

(1 )
2
t +
!
(1 !)(1 ) [t   t 1   (1  )xt 1]2 +O
1=2 1 ;e; %2 which is easily seen to be increasing in both  and !.
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Finally, we consider welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium on a conditional basis. Specically,
we analyse welfare conditional on ination and output gap at time 0, as well as at time  1, being at their
conditional value of zero. There is one main point to take from Figures (23)-(26), which are analogous
to Figures (19)-(22). While the welfare levels on a conditional basis are practically the same as on an
unconditional basis, the ranking between the alternative commitment policies changes. As for the degree of
price stickiness, zero-optimal policy is better than the two timeless perspective policies, with the standard
timeless perspective policy being univocally superior to the alternative timeless perspective policy. As
for the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour, zero-optimal policy is inferior to the two timeless perspective
policies, with the standard timeless perspective policy still being univocally superior to the alternative
timeless perspective policy.
4 Conclusions
This paper studies di¤erent types of commitment policy in an economy where the deterministic steady
state is ine¢ cient. We consider the canonical purely forward-looking New Keynesian model and its variant
due to backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by a fraction of price setters, specied either à la Galì
and Gertler (1999) or à la Steinsson (2003). We study the zero-optimal policy and the timeless perspective
policy. Woodford (1999) labels policy timeless, namely time-invariant, as it reects a type of commitment
that, unlike the zero-optimal policy, constraints the policy reaction function to be the same in the initial
period as in all succeeding periods. More recently, Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) show
that the timeless perspective policy, as usually described, is not optimal in the sense of Taylor (1979),
who proposes adopting a monetary policy that is optimal from the perspective of the average value of the
central banks loss function.
We show how this alternative timeless perspective policy entails optimal positive long-run ination
target, even in the purely forward-looking basic New Keynesian model. The intuition for this result is
quite neat, hinging on the discount factor. Under Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) timeless
perspective policy, the central banks discount factor di¤ers from the private sectors discount factor:
the private sector prefers current consumption to future consumption whereas the central bank does not
discount future, namely every loss for the central bank is equally costly. On the one hand, the private
sectors discount factor appears in the models structural equations, thus resulting in the long-run Phillips
curve trade-o¤. On the other hand, the central bank now equally weighs the increase in output caused by
higher ination and the cost of the reduction in output as a result of expected higher ination. It follows
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that the stimulative e¤ect of higher ination on output is greater than the output cost of higher ination.
The long-run Phillips curve trade-o¤ is then exploited and it is optimal for the central bank to commit to
positive steady-state ination.
With this respect, the paper can be read as a second answer to what causes positive ination to be
endogenously optimal in the long-run. It can be either optimality in the sense of Taylor (1979), which is
achieved by the commitment policy suggested by the approach of policy design, or, as shown in Pontiggia
(2007), costly disination. The former in fact rationalises a positive optimal long-run ination target even
in a model where the central bank is on paper capable of disinating without incurring any loss in output.
Indeed, the optimal long-run ination target is zero in only one of the six theoretical cases studied.
Moreover, di¤erently from the standard timeless perspective commitment policy, the alternative timeless
perspective commitment policy is robust to the introduction of backward-looking rule-of thumb behaviour
à la Galì and Gertler (1999) as this does not alter the steady state that would obtain under forward-looking
behaviour by all price setters. This arguably desirable property does not apply in the case of backward-
looking rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003) as indexation to past output gap by rule-of-thumb
price setters changes both the long-run trade-o¤ between output gap and ination and the steady-state
central banks loss function.
We evaluate the alternative commitment policies both the on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium
and on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium. In so doing, our main objective is, as in Jensen and
McCallum (2002), to simply rank the alternative commitment policies. We present robustness analysis
for ample ranges of two structural parameters: the degree of price stickiness and the degree of rule-of-
thumb behaviour. We follow the cited papers and report average values of the central banks objective
function. Regardless of the details of price setting, zero-optimal commitment policy invariably delivers the
highest level of welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium and the alternative timeless perspective
policy is univocally superior to the standard timeless perspective policy. Moreover, the alternative timeless
perspective commitment policy always implies better welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium
than a policy of zero ination at all times, whereas the same it is not always true under the standard
timeless perspective commitment policy. As for welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium, the
ranking between the three alternative commitment policies is not strictly univocal, but the alternative
timeless perspective policy is usually found to rank rst, followed by the standard timeless perspective
policy and both timeless perspective policies outperform the zero-optimal policy.
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6 Tables
Model n Commitment Policy ZW BJM
FL  = 0  > 0
=
GG  > 0 6=  > 0
6= 6=
S  > 0 6=  > 0
Table 1. Optimal long-run ination target
Structural parameter   $  1
Value 0:99 7:88 0:47 0:16
Table 2. Woodfords (2003) benchmark calibration (quarterly)
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7 Figures
Figure 1. Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium in the purely forward-looking New Keynesian model.
Figure 2. Condition (62). Points below the line implyW
GGW
>W
FLW
, points above the line implyW
GGW
<W
FLW
.
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Figure 3. Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of price stickiness in
the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999).
Figure 4. Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of rule-of-thumb
behaviour in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999).
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Figure 5. Locus of combinations of the degree of price stickiness and the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour such
that W
GGW
is at its relative (absolute) maximum.
Figure 6. Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of price stickiness in
the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003).
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Figure 7. Welfare on the basis of the deterministic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of rule-of-thumb
behaviour in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003).
Figure 8. Locus of combinations of the degree of price stickiness and the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour such
that W
SW
is at its relative (absolute) maximum.
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Figure 9. Welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium in the purely forward-looking New Keynesian model.
Figure 10. Welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium in the purely forward-looking New Keynesian model:
di¤erence in the welfare levels between any pair of commitment policies.
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Figure 11. Unconditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of price
stickiness in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999).
Figure 12. Unconditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of price
stickiness in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999): di¤erence in the
welfare levels between any pair of commitment policies.
38
Figure 13. Unconditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of
rule-of-thumb behaviour in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999).
Figure 14. Unconditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of
rule-of-thumb behaviour in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999):
di¤erence in the welfare levels between any pair of commitment policies.
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Figure 15. Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of price
stickiness in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999).
Figure 16. Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of price
stickiness in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999): di¤erence in the
welfare levels between any pair of commitment policies.
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Figure 17. Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of rule-of-
thumb behaviour in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999).
Figure 18. Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of rule-of-
thumb behaviour in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì and Gertler (1999): di¤erence
in the welfare levels between any pair of commitment policies.
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Figure 19. Unconditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of price
stickiness in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003).
Figure 20. Unconditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of price
stickiness in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003): di¤erence in the welfare
levels between any pair of commitment policies.
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Figure 21. Unconditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of
rule-of-thumb behaviour in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003).
Figure 22. Unconditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of
rule-of-thumb behaviour in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003): di¤erence
in the welfare levels between any pair of commitment policies.
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Figure 23. Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of price
stickiness in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003).
Figure 24. Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of price
stickiness in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003): di¤erence in the welfare
levels between any pair of commitment policies.
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Figure 25. Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of rule-of-
thumb behaviour in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003).
Figure 26. Conditional welfare on the basis of the stochastic equilibrium for di¤erent values of the degree of rule-of-
thumb behaviour in the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Steinsson (2003): di¤erence in the
welfare levels between any pair of commitment policies.
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